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Computer Adoption and Returns in Transition 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Starting in the 1980s, there was a general trend toward rising income inequality in 
European and North American economies.  A large literature has attributed at least a share of the 
rising inequality to rising returns to education associated with skill-biased technical change, 
particularly in information technologies (IT).1  Because more educated workers are presumed to 
have skills that are complementary with capital, these technological changes are responsible for a 
systematic shift in labor demand toward educated labor that has raised earnings for IT users in 
many OECD countries.2  Corroborating evidence can be found in the connection between IT 
investments and economy-wide growth in labor productivity in the OECD economies.3  By 
raising the productivity and/or lowering the cost of capital, firms can afford to raise pay for 
educated labor. 
 Transition economies have been characterized by rapidly increasing returns to education 
(Brainerd, 2000; Fleisher et al, 2005; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995).  A common rationale for 
this result is that under the previous planned system, centrally dictated wages artificially limited 
income inequality by raising pay for the least skilled through transfers from the most productive 
sectors and workers in the economy.  When the centrally dictated wage system was disabled, 
market forces raised relative pay for educated workers to levels more similar to those observed in 
the west. 
 Past research has not established whether rising returns to schooling in transition 
economies can also be linked to information technologies as in the OECD economies.  There is 
only weak corroborating information that IT has accelerated growth in transition economies.4  
One weakness of past research on adoption of and returns to information technologies in 
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transition economies has been the lack of detailed data on computer use and earnings.  Most 
studies rely on data aggregated to the country level, and so household data needed to estimate 
adoption of or returns to computer adoption have not been available.   
 There are several reasons why IT technologies may not lead to the same productivity or 
wage gains in transition economies as in the OECD economies.  One is that the 
telecommunications infrastructure in the formerly planned states is underdeveloped. While the 
Soviet economy invested heavily in capital, those investments were weighted toward the military 
and manufacturing sectors that generated virtually no return (Easterly and Fischer, 1995).  
Consequently, most of the formerly planned economies entered transition with poorly developed 
communications systems compared to the west.  For instance, even after ten years of transition, 
teledensity, the number of phone lines per 100 residents averaged 19 in former Soviet states 
compared to 41 in Europe and 66 in the United States. (ITU, 2003). 
 A second factor is that IT is extremely expensive in transition countries relative to local 
ability to pay.  State-run telecommunications monopolies have not had to face foreign or 
domestic competition, allowing them to keep prices high and service quality low compared to the 
west.  Often, only corporate clients, banks, and foreign representative offices can afford these 
services.  One month of Internet service costs on an average 13.5% of per capita monthly income 
in these nine countries, the lowest cost being in Bulgaria at 1.4% of monthly income.  In 
contrast, a month of off-peak service costs only 0.2% of monthly income in the U.S., 0.7% in the 
U.K. and 0.9% in France.5  Revin’s (2001) analysis for Uzbekistan found that one hour of 
daytime dial-up connection provided by the official telecommunications monopoly UzPAK cost 
8% of the average monthly salary.  One hour of nighttime dial-up service costs about half that, 
but is still clearly unaffordable for the average citizen.  As we argue theoretically, high computer 
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costs can suppress wage differentials between workers using and not using computers on the job, 
suggesting that transition economies may not have a digital divide in earnings. 
 Cross-country studies of computer and Internet usage rates have pointed to high prices, 
lack of telecommunications infrastructure and regulatory constraints on competition along with 
low per capita incomes and/or education levels as reasons why IT use lags in transition 
economies.6   And they do lag: as of 2002, the ratio of personal computers per 100 residents 
ranged from a low of 0.9 in Armenia to 8.9 in Russia, well below the 20 PCs per 100 resident in 
Europe or 62.5 PCs per 100 residents in the U.S..  Shrinking this digital divide across countries 
will require improving the IT infrastructure as well as improving the human capital in transition 
countries.   
 This study addresses two questions not addressed by the cross-country studies of IT use:  
1) what is the nature of the digital divide within as well as across transition economies? and 2) 
what can we tell of the impact of the digital divide on earnings inequality in transition countries?  
These questions are addressed using household data from nine formerly planned economies: 
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
 We find that, as in OECD countries, it is the young, educated, urban workers in transition 
economies that are the most likely to use computers at work.  Computer usage is also closely tied 
to the quality of the telecommunications infrastructure that would improve the productivity of 
computers.  However, computer usage at work is particularly tied to the ability to speak foreign 
languages, especially English.  Finally, at least part of the variation in computer usage is driven 
by individual interests: particularly among individuals with interests in science or politics. 
 Has the digital divide served as a source of income inequality in transition economies?  
Our findings suggest the answer is no.  When computer use is treated as exogenous, estimated 
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returns are comparable to the 20% found in studies in Europe and North America.  However, 
controlling for likely simultaneity in computer adoption causes the estimated returns to become 
negative and insignificant compared to the modest positive returns found for OECD countries.  
These results are consistent with a model in which the high costs of operating computers in 
transition countries suppresses wage differentials between firms with and wiothout computers.  
Our findings suggest that thus far, the digital divide has not exacerbated income inequality in 
transition economies. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief literature review 
along with a simple model of computer adoption and income returns to computer adoption. 
Section III describes data and variables used in the study, while Section IV describes our 
estimation strategy. The results relating to the determinants of computer adoption are presented 
in Section V. Section VI then presents results that relate computer adoption to earnings. Section 
VII concludes.  
II.  Theory and Literature Review 
A.  Computer adoption 
 We assume that an individual chooses a job involving computer use if the expected utility 
dominates that of other jobs not involving a computer.  The expected utility from computer 
adoption is approximated by 
(1) c1 ij ij ij ij ij ij ijV (C 1;Y , H , Z ,T , , τ )ξ= , 
where Cij is a dummy variable indicating computer use on a job available to individual i in 
country j, Yij is the income earned at that job, Hij is a vector of individual skills, Zij is a vector of 
demographic variables, Tij is a vector of locally available technologies such as 
telecommunications infrastructure that alter the cost or productivity of using a computer, ijξ is 
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unobservable individual ability which is specific to job j, and cijτ  is the hedonic return to 
computer use on the job.  Similarly, the utility from a job not involving computer use is given by 
(2) 0 ij ij ij ij ij ijV (C 0;Y ,H , Z ,T , )ξ= . 
The probability of selecting a job involving computer use can be written as 
{ }cij 1 ij ij ij ij ij ij ij 2 ij ij ij ij ij ijP(C 1) P V (C 1;Y ,H , Z ,T , , τ ) V (C 0;Y ,H , Z ,T , )  0ξ ξ= = = − = > . 
The linear approximation will have the form 
(3) { }cij 0 1 ij 2 ij 3 ij 4 ij 5 ij 6 ijP(C 1) P α α Y α H α Z α T α τ α 0ξ= = + + + + + + > , 
where the parameters, αk, indicate the relative utility of applying the kth attribute on a job using 
computers relative to a job not using computers. If 0,α k >  then the kth factor can be interpreted 
as being complementary with computer use on the job. 6 ijα ξ  is an error term reflecting the 
difference in the productivity of unobserved ability in jobs with and without computers.  The 
error term is  assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. 
 Past studies of computer adoption in western economies have generated consistent 
predictions and empirical regularities of how human capital measures, Hij, should affect 
incentives to adopt computers.  Education is presumed to rise with computer use, both because it 
increases the ability to learn how to use the computer and because of presumed complementarity 
in production between education and information technologies.  These presumptions are 
consistent with the empirical findings of Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987), Doms, Dunne and 
Troske (1997), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), and Abdulai and Huffman (2003) among others. 
 As an individual ages, the length of time to recoup the investment in computers 
decreases.  Therefore, the young have the greatest incentive to adopt computers.  This 
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presumption is also consistent with empirical studies based in western economies including 
studies by Huffman and Mercier (1991). 
 Computer adoption is expected to vary with income for several reasons. Computers 
provide consumer services such as word processing, record keeping, communication and 
information that households value.  The demand for these consumption services are expected to 
increase with income. Second, in transition economies, liquidity constraints are prevalent and so 
the cost of borrowing is likely to fall as household wealth or available collateral increases.  
Therefore, computer adoption is likely to increase with household income or wealth.  Even in 
western economies where liquidity constraints are less severe, there is a strong positive 
relationship between computer use and household income (Schirmer and Goetz, 1997; Fairlie 
,2004). For transition economies, therefore, the relationship is expected to be even stronger. 7 
 There is no strong prediction about the expected impact of household demographic 
variables on computer adoption, but past studies have shown that computer use is less common 
among minority households and rural households. Several studies in the United States identified 
a significant race effect in computer adoption (Hoffman and Novak ,1998; NSF ,2001; Fairlie, 
2004). 
 Computer adoption is more expensive when available telecommunications infrastructure, 
Tij, is of poor quality.  While Tij will vary across countries, it may vary within countries as well, 
particularly between more and less densely populated areas of the country.  Cross-country 
studies such as those by Muller and Salsas (2003) and Chinn and Fairlie (2004)  have found that 
the level of computer or Internet use in a country can be tied to the proportion of households with 
telephone lines, a measure of telephone infrastructure.  We control for cross-country differences 
in telecommunication infrastructure with a series of country dummy variables.  Within country, 
we created a measure of local access to satellite or cable television access. These services can 
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enhance the productivity of computer usage on the job by lowering the cost and/or increasing the 
productivity of Internet applications.   
 There is an additional reason for the use of computers in transition economies that is 
taken somewhat for granted in the OECD economies: that computers expand greatly the 
information base available to remotely located individuals.  Individuals with strong interest in 
accessing current local or global political, scientific, or cultural information will have an 
incentive to adopt computers, even if the information has no direct economic return.  This source 
of taste for computer access, cijτ , is particularly important in transition economies where foreign 
information sources are frequently viewed as more reliable than domestic, state-owned media.  
The young are the most interested in learning about news abroad and in communicating with 
foreign peers and the young are most likely to list information obtained on the Internet as 
reliable, whether or not they have ever used the Internet (InterMedia, 2001). 
  Eighty percent of web sites in the world are in English.  Most of the rest are in a language 
of international commerce (French, German, Italian, Japanese or Spanish).  Consequently, 
language skills would be expected to be closely tied to computer adoption, a hypothesis 
consistent with Fairlie’s (2004) findings for the U.S..  Language skills are likely to be even more 
important in the computer adoption decision in transition economies where web sites in the 
native language are a small fraction of the web sites available in English or the others listed 
above. 
B.  Returns to computer adoption. 
 The standard approach to estimating returns to human capital investments, following 
Mincer (1974) is to estimate an equation relating the logarithm of earnings to measures of 
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education and work experience.  Following Krueger (1993), the enhanced log earnings function 
can be written as 
(4)  ij 0 1 ij 2 ij 3 ijlnY β β C β H β Z ijε= + + + + , 
where the coefficient, 1β , is interpretable as the rate of return from use of a computer. 
The variables are defined as before and ij 6 ij ijε α ξ φ= +  is an error term that reflects the worker’s 
unobserved ability plus a pure random error. If ijξ  is uncorrelated with the regressors, then 
ordinary least squares estimation of (4) will yield unbiased estimates of 1β .  However, if 
computer adoption depends on unobserved abilities as in (3), this is almost certainly not the case 
unless the worker’s unobserved abilities are equally productive in both jobs (i.e. 6 0ijα ξ = ).  The 
likely correlation between Cij and ξij will cause bias in the least squares estimation of 1β in (4), 
although the direction of bias is difficult to predict.  If higher ability raises the probability of 
computer adoption and there are no other sources of bias in (4), we would expect positive values 
of ξij to be positively correlated with Cij, and so least squares estimates of 1β would be biased 
upward.  
 This formulation can be shown to be consistent with a model in which perfectly 
competitive firms decide whether or not to invest in computer technologies at a cost that is 
highest in markets with poor IT infrastructure. 8 Workers decide whether to work at firms with or 
without computers based on the relative utility of the two jobs, as in (3).  Wages paid in the firms 
with computer technologies will be equal to the marginal product of labor net of the computer 
cost while wages at other firms are equal to the lower marginal product.  The equilibrium shows 
that workers in the firms with computers have both more observed and unobserved human 
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capital than do workers in firms without computers.  This sorting depends on the productivity 
and cost of computer adoption and on the worker tastes for computers.   
 The role of computer costs is particularly important: as the IT infrastructure gets weaker, 
fewer firms invest in computer technologies, wages for all workers decline, and the gap in pay 
between workers working with and without computers gets smaller.  However, holding wages 
fixed, workers with stronger tastes for computer use will sort more readily into firms with 
computers.  It is even possible that if the IT infrastructure is very weak and the worker tastes for 
working with computers are sufficiently strong, wages in firms using computers may end up 
below the wage the same worker would earn in a firm without computers. 
 This model also suggests how we could  identify Cij in (4).  We require variables that 
vary the probability of computer use without directly raising income.  From (3), the best 
candidates available would be expected to be measures of Tij and cijτ , but the equilibrium model 
found that all wages rise with Tij.  Consistent with this prediction, local access to satellite or 
cable television, our measure of within-country variation in technology infrastructure, failed tests 
of exogeneity with respect to earnings.  However, our measure of taste for information cijτ , the 
individual’s self-assessment of the importance of having current information on politics or 
scientific and technological advances, did pass overidentification tests (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 
201).   
 In all specifications attempted, when computer use at work is treated as exogenous, we 
find positive and significant returns to computer use.  However, when the endogeneity of the 
choice to work at a job with computers is controlled, the returns are insignificant, suggesting that 
the least squares estimates overstate the true returns to computer use in transition economies. 
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 We cannot estimate (3) directly because of the presumed reverse causality between 
income and computer utilization.  Instead, we can insert (4) into (3) and solve for Cij.  The 
resulting reduced form of the computer adoption decision will be  
(3’) { }' ' ' ' ' c 'ij 0 2 ij 3 ij 4 ij 5 ij ijP(C 1) P α α H α Z α T α τ 0ξ= = + + + + + >  
 Equation (3’) must be estimated using nonlinear estimation to accommodate the limited 
dependent variable.  Our strategy is to estimate (3’) to generate a predicted value of Cij, ijCˆ ,  
which is then used in place of Cij in the second-stage equation (4).  Because ijCˆ will be purged of 
the impact of Yij  on Cij, ijCˆ  will be uncorrelated with ξij .  This two-step process is not efficient 
and so the standard errors will be biased.  Therefore, we use a bootstrapping procedure to 
generate corrected standard errors for our estimates of equation (4). 9 
 Because these taste measures are an admittedly thin source of identification, we replicate 
our results below using longitudinal data to remove the unobserved ability component ξij on the 
assumption that it is a time-invariant fixed effect.  Results are very consistent with our 
instrumental variables results.  
III.  Data  
 This study utilizes data collected by the InterMedia Survey Institute based in Washington 
D.C.  The data was collected using a stratified random sample of the population in nine 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the year 2000.  The method 
involved randomly selected household addresses from a set of randomly selected postal districts.  
The survey was administered through face-to-face interviews conducted through local agencies. 
Countries included Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan.   Because of the need to tie computer use to earnings, we restricted our data set 
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to working individuals between the ages of 18 to 65.  The pooled sample included 5382 
observations.  Useable sample sizes varied from 275 in Georgia to 907 in Belarus.   
The survey included a wealth of information on access to and attitudes towards 
information, media, democracy and politics, the primary purpose for the survey. However, it also 
included questions on computer usage, availability of local telecommunications services, and 
household income as well as information on human capital and other demographic information, 
which made the data adaptable for a study of computer adoption and returns to usage in 
transition economies. 
Summary statistics for all the variables utilized in the study are presented in Table 1.  
Country-level averages are reported in Table 2.  The first dependent variable used in the analysis 
is a binary variable on computer use at work. The computer use measure is inferred from 
responses to questions asking whether an individual has used a computer, and for those 
answering affirmatively, responses to a question asking whether they use a computer at work.  
Individuals who use a computer but not at work and individuals who never use a computer are in 
the reference group.  At 14%, computer use is comparatively low relative to OECD countries.  In 
our working sample, 13% access computers at work but only 4% access computers at home.  
That illustrates the potential importance of computer access at work as a job perquisite.   
The measure of earnings is the log of household monthly income in dollars. The survey 
reports income in ranges of the home currency instead of exact values, so we use the midpoint of 
the range for income.10  Monthly income is converted to U.S. dollars using 2000 Purchasing 
Power Parity exchange rates.  Average monthly household income varied from a low of $29 in 
Moldova to a high of  $164 in Bulgaria.  To avoid measurement errors in the currency exchange, 
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the regressions use country-level dummy variables that will correct for variation in currency 
values across countries. 
 Use of household income is not ideal because of the possibility of multiple earners in the 
household.  Household size varies from under 3 in Russia to nearly 6 in Uzbekistan.  We control 
the problem in two ways.  First, in the full sample, the regression controls for the number of 
potential earners in the household using information on household composition (number of 
household members and information on marital status).  Second, we replicate all results using 
only the subsample of male workers and again using the subsamples of two person and one 
person households so that household income can be equated with individual income.  Finally, we 
make use of an alternative longitudinal data set, the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS) that has information on individual earnings.  Qualitative results are similar across the 
various samples which should help to allay concerns that our results are driven by measurement 
problems.  
 The explanatory variables are subdivided into four categories:  human capital, 
demographic, taste, and telecommunications infrastructure.  Human capital measures, Hij, show 
that all these countries are reasonably highly educated with averages at 12-14 years.   Ability to 
speak English is somewhat rare at 11% with 10% speaking another G-7 language.  Language 
skills vary extensively: the proportion speaking English ranges from 3% in Uzbekistan to 28% in 
Romania.  Ability to speak other G-7 languages correlates highly with ability to speak English.   
 There is also variation across and within countries in telecommunications access.  Past 
cross-country studies have used country averages of telephone, cable or satellite access as 
measures of telecommunications infrastructure, but our use of country dummy variables controls 
for this source of cross-country variation.  Our remaining measure of Tij is the availability of 
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cable or satellite service in the local community.  Note that this measure is not merely a proxy 
for more populous areas, as we also include the dummy variable that indicates whether the 
individual resides in an urban area. Bulgaria and Romania have the best local 
telecommunications infrastructure access, while these complementary technologies are nearly 
absent in Armenia. 
  The key measure of taste for information cijτ  is based on individual assessments of 
personal interest in various topics.  Responses vary from “Not at all interested,” “Not very 
interested,” “Somewhat interested,” or “Very interested.”  Because computer technology aids 
information gathering and processing, individuals who place greater priority on having current 
information should be more motivated toward computer adoption. 
 The most important of the demographic variables is the urban dummy variable that is 
included to help control for underlying differences in prices between metropolitan and rural 
markets within a country.  Roughly two-thirds of the sample are urban residents, ranging from 
39% in Uzbekistan to 81% in Bulgaria.   
IV.  Determinants of computer use at work 
 The computer adoption equation (3’) is our means of identifying the nature of the digital 
divide within these transition economies.  Few household-level studies exist of technology 
adoption in transition economies more generally, much less of IT adoption.  These estimates will 
help establish who in the emerging market economies will be most likely to invest in the skills 
needed for new technologies generally, and who will adopt the IT technologies needed to 
integrate into the global economy.   
 Results of the probit estimation for the pooled sample for nine countries are included in 
Table 3.  Dummy variables for each country were included but not reported.  The marginal 
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effects are reported to ease interpretation.  The variables can explain 24% of the variation in 
computer use on the job. 
 Human capital measures have a large effect on the probability of computer use at work.   
Age has a negative and significant effect on computer use, although the magnitude of the effect 
is small—a two percentage point decrease for every 10 years of age11.  Formal schooling has a 
substantial effect on computer adoption.  Every year of education increases the probability of 
computer use by 2 percentage points, roughly the same amount as a ten year decrease in age. 
Relative to an individual with average education (12.6 years), a college graduate is 52% more 
likely to use a computer at work.  This skill technology complementarity is similar to that found 
in the U.S. and in other OECD countries (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al.,1998). 
More unique is the very large effect of language ability on the likelihood of accessing a 
computer at work.  Those who speak English are 11 % more likely to use a computer at work 
than those who don’t.  Those who speak other G7 languages are 3 % more likely to use a 
computer at work.  Speaking Russian has a positive but smaller and statistically insignificant 
impact on computer use.   
Urban dwellers are 5% more likely to use computers on the job.  Access to cable or 
satellite service has an effect 3 times larger, the largest marginal effect of any factor in the 
model.  Even with small average computer usage rates, it is clear that there is a substantial urban-
rural digital divide in transition economies.  Some of this may reflect underlying tastes of 
residents if those wishing to use IT technologies move across communities to areas with better 
infrastructure.  Nevertheless, our results still find a substantial role for individual variation in 
human capital, as equalizing access to telecommunications infrastructure will not eliminate the 
digital divide. 
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Household size and marital status did not influence the likelihood of computer use at 
work.  Males and females were equally likely to use computers.  Except for urban residence, 
computer use was driven by human capital and telecommunications infrastructure, a result very 
consistent with the cross-country evidence presented by Chinn and Fairlie (2004). 
Taste for information also has an effect on computer usage at work. Those very interested 
in political information are 4% more likely to use a computer at work than are those with no 
interest whatsoever.  Nearly identical effects exist for science and technology information, albeit 
somewhat less precisely estimated.  The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the two taste for 
information measures were jointly zero in the computer adoption equation was easily rejected, 
and so these instruments will have some power to distinguish computer users from nonusers. 
To check the stability of these results over the various subsamples described in the data 
section, we replicated the estimation using the sample of employed males only; the sample of 
employed individuals in households with only one or two members; and the sample of workers 
who are the sole member of their household.  The last sample only had 222 observations and 
lacked precise estimates, but the qualitative results were similar to the other three samples.   
Our greatest concern was that a model of individual choice could differ in the context of a 
household with multiple decision-makers.  A comparison of the estimated marginal effects 
across samples in Table 3 shows that the concern was unfounded:  the results are very consistent 
across samples.  In all samples, the instruments passed the test of joint significance, albeit only at 
the tenth percentile for the male worker subsample. 
We also replicated the estimation for individual countries for which we had sufficient 
observations.  Partial results for the key variables are reported at the top of Table 5.  Again, the 
results are qualitatively similar, although significance suffers with the smaller samples.  Signs 
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are identical for all human capital measures and for urban residence.  The taste measures are at 
least marginally jointly significant in four of the six countries and signs disagree only for interest 
in science and technology.  
We can use the variation in computer adoption models across countries to explore the 
role of the various factors in the cross-country digital divide.   Findings of the observed 
difference between computer adoption in each country and the mean adoption rate across all 
countries are reported in the middle section of Table 5.  Some apparent regularities arise, 
although they are not completely consistent across countries.  Good infrastructure explains 
higher adoption rates in Bulgaria and Romania and weak infrastructure retards adoption in 
Uzbekistan.  Strong human capital endowments help the adoption rates in Romania and Ukraine 
and weak human capital limits adoption in Uzbekistan. The urban share of the population 
increases adoption rates in Belarus, Bulgaria and Russia and lowers adoption rates in Uzbekistan.   
Overall, the factors responsible for the digital divide in transition countries are quite 
similar to those identified in western economies.  The average user of computer technologies 
could be of any sex, but he/she is likely to be younger, urban, better educated, well informed, 
speaking a major trade language, and living in an area with infrastructure that can support 
computer technology.   These conclusions are consistent across various subsamples.  They 
suggest that there is great potential for digital divides within and between transition countries 
including divides between education groups, between urban and rural areas, between areas with 
and without telecommunications infrastructure, between generations, and between those who do 
and do not speak the languages of international commerce. In the next section, we assess whether 
these divides will exacerbate income inequality in these countries. 
V.  Returns to computer adoption 
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In the second stage of our analysis, we use a Mincerian log earnings function 
supplemented by actual and predicted use of computers to measure the extent to which the digital 
divide has led to earnings inequality. The sample sizes vary modestly because some individuals 
did not report income.  Results are reported in Table 4.  Across all specifications, the earnings 
functions fit quite well with over 50% of the variance explained by the model. 12    
When computer use is treated as exogenous, the estimated returns are positive, 
significant, and at roughly 25% return, toward the upper end of the range of returns reported 
from least squares analysis using similar specifications in western economies.13   Noting that our 
taste-based instruments may be suspect,14 when instruments are used to correct for the 
endogeneity of computer usage at work, the estimated returns become insignificant.15  Two 
important inferences follow.  First, the finding of upward bias in least squares estimates of the 
returns to computer adoption are consistent with a model in which the workers that take jobs 
involving computers are those with unobserved atypical abilities.  The higher wages earned by 
these workers are attributable to this unobserved ability and not to the computer usage per se.  
Second, computer usage at work is not exacerbating the rise in income inequality in these 
transition economies, at least thus far. 
The first result merits some elaboration.  It is common for endogeneity corrected results 
in OECD countries to be smaller than the least squares estimates, but they are still usually 
positive in the 2-10% range.16  As mentioned above, competitive firms who adopt computers will 
set pay net of the cost of computer use.  These transition economies have relatively weak IT 
infrastructure and high Internet costs compared to the OECD economies that were the focus of 
earlier studies.  The higher are the costs of computer use, the lower will be the wage differential 
between firms with and without computers.  Our corrected estimates are lower, albeit not 
 18
precisely estimated, than the comparable findings using OECD country data, suggesting that the 
wages of workers using computers in transition economies may be artificially low because of the 
high costs firms face in acquiring and using computer technologies.17  The same story is found at 
the bottom of Table 5 where we report estimates for the subset of countries where we have 
sufficient observations. 
The other variables have interest as well.  All of the human capital measures increase in 
magnitude in the IV estimation.  Returns to language are substantial: 18% for knowing English 
and 12% for knowing another G7 language.  There is no significant return to speaking Russian.  
Undoubtedly, part of the large return to these languages is due to the relatively small proportion 
who hold these language skills, and so we would expect the marginal returns to be bid downward 
as more individuals acquire these languages.  Urban dwellers and men earn more than rural 
residents and women respectively.  The magnitudes of these gaps are somewhat smaller than 
their counterparts in OECD countries.   
There is a substantial return to local telecommunications infrastructure, consistent with 
Piatkowski’s (2004) conclusion regarding the role of IT investment on growth.  It is interesting 
that wages generally rise with local IT infrastructure access, but not atypically for individuals 
using the local IT technologies at work.  Apparently, due to network effects, the returns to IT 
access are shared more broadly in the population than just to the subset using the technology 
directly. 
We were concerned that household income might reflect the earnings of others in the 
household and not just the respondent.  While we correct at least partially for the number of 
potential earners in the household by controlling for marital status and the number of household 
members, we also examined how robust our results were to alternative subsamples that limited 
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the number of multiple earners.  Presumably, working women would be more likely to have a 
working spouse, and so the restriction to male workers should have reduced the possible bias 
from multiple earners.  The results are hardly changed at all.  When we restrict the sample to 
households with only one or two members, again the estimated returns hardly change.  When we 
further restricted the sample to include only single member households, the qualitative results 
remained the same, but the coefficient estimates lost precision due to the very small samples.  In 
every subsample, returns to computer use were positive and significant when treated as 
exogenous but insignificant when treated as endogenous. 
VI. Longitudinal Analysis 
 The cross-country cross-sectional analysis leaves open the possibility that the conclusions 
regarding the returns to computer use in transition economies are influenced by individual-
specific fixed effects such as unmeasured ability or ambition that may be correlated with the 
regressors in the earnings function (4).  Despite passing the overidentification tests, our 
instruments underlying the instrumental variable estimation in Tables 4 and 5 might be 
questionable.  Several papers (Entorf et al, 1999; Dolton and Makepiece, 2004; Krashinsky, 
2004) have used longitudinal data on individuals to control for unobserved ability in estimating 
the returns to computer use.  These difference-in-differences estimates rely on changes in 
computer use to identify the effect of computer use on the growth in earnings.  We follow that 
strategy to assess the extent to which our results may be biased by missing controls from 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
 The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) provides longitudinal data on 
earnings and includes a question on whether the respondent used a computer on the job.  The 
same questions are repeated annually from 2000 to 2004, allowing us an alternative way to 
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assess whether computer use on the job earns atypical returns in transition economies.  Suppose 
that two successive years of earnings data can be described by the following equations  
(5A) i1 01 1 i1 21 i 31 i i1lnY β β C β H β Z iξ φ= + + + + +  
(5B) i2 02 1 i2 22 i 32 i i2lnY β β C β H β Z iξ φ= + + + + +  
where ξi is an unobserved, time invariant ability, Hi and Zi are, respectively, time invariant 
measures of human capital and demographic characteristics, and itφ  is a random error.  Computer 
use on the job, Cit, varies over time.  We allow the returns to human capital and demographic 
attributes to vary over time, as has been commonly found in the early transition (Brainerd 
(2000), Fleisher et al (2005)).   
 In the specification above, the likely covariance between φi and Cit will lead to biased 
estimates of the returns to computer use in ordinary least squares estimation of a single cross-
section as in (5A).  Differencing the data eliminates φi as in   
(6) i2 02 01 1 i2 i1 22 21 i 32 31 i i2 i1
i1
Yln( ) (β -β ) β (C C ) (β -β )H (β -β )Z ( )
Y
φ φ= + − + + + −  
Assuming the differenced random error terms are uncorrelated with the change in computer use 
on the job, least squares estimation of (6) will yield an unbiased measure of β1. 
 Table 6 reports the results of the cross sectional specification (5A) and the differenced 
specification (6) estimated over the years 2000 through 2004.  Because we have repeated 
observations over individuals, we use a random effects specification.  The results are remarkably 
consistent with the cross country findings in Table 4 and the OLS and IV estimates using 
Russian data in Table 5.  When computer use is treated as exogenous, the estimated return is 0.17 
and is highly significant.  Similar qualitative results were obtained when we estimated the cross 
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sectional relationship for individual years.  The corresponding estimates in Tables 4 and 5 vary 
between 0.23 and 0.26 and are also highly significant.   
 The first differenced estimates divide the workers into four groups, those using 
computers in both years (Yes, Yes); those who never use computers (No, No); those who go 
from nonuse to use (No, Yes); and those who stop using computers (Yes, No).  Using those who 
never use computers as a reference group, we would expect a positive coefficient on (No, Yes) 
and a negative coefficient on (Yes, No) if computer use at work raises earnings. We get that 
pattern, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant.  When we estimate the equation for a 
specific year, the coefficient on (No, Yes) is only positive and significant in one of the four 
years. The IV estimates of the effect of computer use on earnings in Table 4 are all negative and 
insignificant, while the IV estimate of the impact of computer use on earnings in Russia in Table 
5 is positive but insignificant.  Roughly 12% of the sample are switchers, with half of these 
entering jobs with computers and half leaving jobs with computers. 
 The results in Table 6 buttress our earlier conclusions from Tables 4 and 5 that the 
apparent positive effect of computers on earnings in transition economies are due to highly 
productive workers being attracted to jobs involving computer use and not to a causal positive 
effect of computers on earnings.  Correcting for nonrandom sorting of workers into the group 
using computers at work reduces the estimated return to computer use and in no case is the 
estimated return statistically significant. 
VII. Conclusions 
The digital divide in transition economies is driven by the same factors (age, education, 
urban residence, information technology infrastructure) that are important in established market 
economies.  In addition, ability to speak English and other G7 languages have a particularly 
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strong effect on computer adoption, presumably because these language skills are 
complementary with computer use, given the preponderance of web sites written in English.  An 
additional source of interest in computer usage in transition economies is that the Internet offers 
access to external sources of information on politics, business, culture, and science: information 
that is regarded as more reliable than that provided by domestic state-run media.   
Computers and Internet connections are very expensive relative to per capita incomes in 
many transition economies.  Consequently, home ownership of computers is relatively rare and 
most computer users access computers at work.  Because competitive firms have to reduce the 
wages they offer workers to take into account these high usage costs, wage differences between 
computers users and nonusers are reduced in transition economies and they could even favor 
nonusers if workers get utility from using computers on the job.  In our samples, it appears that 
the higher average pay for workers using computers in transition economies is attributable to the 
fact that computer users are drawn from the group of workers with atypically high unobserved 
ability and not to the computer use per se.   
Note that if the cost of computer use falls in the future, wage differentials favoring computer 
users may yet appear in these transition economies.  As pointed out by a referee, the high costs 
could be due to monopoly pricing or competitive pricing of naturally occurring high costs.  The 
possible policy implications are not the same, as the government may wish to regulate prices or 
invite foreign competition in the former case, but it may need to decide whether intervention is 
even warranted in the latter.  
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Table 1 Summary information for different sub samples of working adults 
 
 All working individuals 
aged 18-65 (n=5382) 
All working males aged 18-
65 (n=2884) 
All working individuals 
aged 18-65 in households 
with one or two occupants 
(n=1066) 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
      
Use computer at       
home 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 
work 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 
school 0.02 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.02 0.14 
Friends /relatives 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 
       
Income (dollars) 101.02 87.81 105.17 84.08 86.08 68.9 
Income (log) 4.26 0.92 4.32 0.91 4.13 0.89 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
      
HUMAN CAPITAL       
Age 39.30 10.85 39.08 11.12 44.13 12.33 
Education 12.62 2.73 12.44 2.75 12.75 2.99 
English 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 
G7 Language 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 
Russian 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.73 0.44 
DEMOGRAPHICS       
Male 0.54 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.44 0.50 
Urban 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.75 0.43 
Household  Size 3.83 1.76 4.04 1.90 1.76 0.42 
Never married 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.37 
INTEREST IN       
Politics 1.90 0.78 1.99 0.76 1.86 0.79 
Science 1.91 0.72 1.94 0.74 1.82 0.70 
INFRASTRUCTURE       
Local service 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 
Table 2 :Summary information for all working households by country 
 
 Armenia 
N=(296) 
Belarus 
(N=907) 
Bulgaria 
(N=598) 
Georgia 
(N=275) 
Moldova 
(N=314) 
Romania 
(N=637) 
Russia 
(N=840) 
Ukraine 
(N=676) 
Uzbekistan 
(N=839) 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
         
Use computer at          
home 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.01 
work 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.05 
school 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Friends /relatives 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 
          
Income (dollars) 56.60 124.13 163.77 80.70 29.12 148.81 104.58 51.08 81.00 
Income(log) 3.71 4.71 5.00 3.84 2.93 4.77 4.38 3.69 4.10 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
         
HUMAN CAPITAL          
Age 40.76 39.69 40.84 41.47 41.37 37.73 40.68 39.67 35.29 
Education 13.02 12.58 12.48 13.96 12.04 12.75 12.58 13.12 11.94 
English 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.28 0.05 0.12 0.05 
G7 Language 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.09 0.03 
Russian 0.89 0.76 0.27 0.86 0.97 0.04 1.00 0.89 0.70 
DEMOGRAPHICS          
Male 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.49 0.62 
Urban 0.68 0.72 0.81 0.48 0.42 0.67 0.77 0.64 0.39 
Household  Size 4.33 3.31 3.58 4.38 3.74 3.53 2.97 3.57 5.57 
Never married 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.09 
INTEREST IN          
Politics 1.66 1.87 1.88 2.00 1.61 1.52 1.84 2.11 2.29 
Science 1.88 1.77 1.68 2.19 1.79 1.84 1.76 2.04 2.33 
INFRASTRUCTURE          
Local service 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.03 
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Table 3:  Probit estimates of the determinants of use of computer at work for working 
adults  
 All workers 18-65 Working males 18-65 Workers 18-65 in 
households with one or 
two occupants 
HUMAN CAPITAL    
Age/10 -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (5.47) (4.33) (3.61) 
Education 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
 (15.67) (10.99) (8.44) 
English 0.11** 0.10** 0.14** 
 (6.64) (4.46) (3.20) 
G7 Language 0.03* 0.02 0.03 
 (2.17) (1.47) (0.86) 
Russian 0.02• 0.02 0.05* 
 (1.77) (1.37) (2.20) 
DEMOGRAPHICS    
Male -0.01  -0.02 
 (1.78)  (1.26) 
Urban 0.05** 0.01 0.03 
 (4.97) (1.01) (1.49) 
Household  Size -0.00 -0.02 0.02 
 (1.16) (-0.78) (1.08) 
Never married -0.00 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.20) (0.68) (0.03) 
INTEREST IN    
Politics 0.01** 0.01• 0.03* 
 (2.61) (1.80) (2.37) 
Science 0.01• 0.00 0.01 
 (1.66) (0.61) (0.89) 
     
INFRASTRUCTURE    
Local service 0.15** 0.21** 0.11 
Joint significance test of 
interest in politics and 
science(χ2 ) 
13.05* 4.64• 8.24* 
Log Likelihood -1544.54 -742.27 -337.11 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.28 0.26 
N 5382 2884 1066 
 
Note :  Values reported are the estimated marginal effects. Specification also included dummy variable controls for 
country and broadly-defined industries (manufacturing, education, sales and services) as well as dummy variables 
for divorced, widowed, and separated.   
z scores  given in parenthesis.  ** significant at the 1st percentile.  * significant at the 5th percentile.  · significant at 
the 10th percentile. 
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Table 4  OLS and Instrumental Variables regressions of log household income for working 
adults 
 
 Total Households Working Males Working households with 
one or two occupants 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
HUMAN CAPITAL       
Computer Use at work 0.23** -0.21   0.24** -0.19     0.27** -0.20 
 (7.95) (1.22) (5.77) (1.00) (4.62) (0.78) 
Age /10   -0.30**    -0.30**    0.30**    -0.03**    -0.05** -0.50** 
 (4.24) (4.49) (3.70) (3.96) (4.50) (4.80) 
(Age2/10)    -0.00**    0.00**    0.00**    0.00**      0.01** 0.01** 
 (4.26) (4.42) (3.76) (3.95) (4.27) (4.39) 
Education    0.06**    0.07**    0.05**    0.07**     0.05** 0.07** 
 (15.63) (9.74) (10.67) (8.95) (6.87) (5.35) 
English     0.09**    0.17**   0.10*    0.19**  0.14* 0.24* 
 (2.94) (4.15) (2.13) (3.15) (2.00) (2.49) 
G7 language    0.10**    0.12**    0.12*    0.14**    0.24** 0.26** 
 (3.25) (3.96) (2.56) (3.02) (3.18) (3.32) 
Russian 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 
 (0.86) (1.17) (0.95) (0.92) (1.09) (0.93) 
DEMOGRAPHICS       
Male    0.10**    0.10**       0.19**     0.18** 
 (5.37) (5.25)   (4.45) (4.14) 
Urban    0.13**     0.15**    0.16** 0.16**     0.21** 0.23** 
 (5.19) (5.43) (4.40)     (4.65) (3.65) (3.67) 
Household size    0.08**    0.08**    0.07**  0.07**     0.18**     0.19** 
 (14.02) (13.19) (9.55)     (8.68)  (3.35) (3.27) 
INFRASTRUCTURE       
Local service     1.18**    1.30**   1.07**    1.24**  0.54*  0.60* 
 (9.23) (9.04) (5.71) (6.59) (2.24) (2.17) 
       
R2  0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 
N 5363 5363 2875 2875 1065 1065 
Overidentification test of 
restriction on interest in politics 
and science(χ2 ) 
4.83* 2.30 1.07 
 Notes : Specification also included dummy variable controls for country and broadly-defined industries 
(manufacturing, education, sales and services) as well as dummy variables for divorced, widowed, and separated. 
Bootstrapped  z scores standard errors reported in parenthesis for IV estimates.  ** significant at the 1st percentile.  * 
significant at the 5th percentile.  
· significant at the 10th percentile 
.
 30
  
Table 5  OLS and Instrumental Variables regressions of log household income for working 
adults (selected countries). 
 
 Belarus   Bulgaria Romania Russia Ukraine  Uzbekistan 
       
COMPUTER ADOPTION EQUATIONa 
Age/10 -0.19** -0.11 -0.25• -0.10   -0.10 -0.14 
 (-2.84) (-1.28) (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.53) (-0.75) 
Education 0.20**   0.23**    0.26**    0.20**   0.16** 0.09** 
 (7.20)    (7.27) (6.76)    (8.18) (5.56) (2.49) 
English 0.41*   0.71**    0.83**    0.78**   0.59** 0.47 
 (2.30) (3.68) (4.60)     (3.38) (3.39) (1.62) 
Urban 0.25 0.69 0.74     0.43*   0.53** 0.11 
 (0.83) (1.40) (0.59)     (2.26) (2.76) (0.53) 
Interest in        
Politics 0.10 0.10 0.19•    0.07 0.02 0.14 
 (1.06) (0.85) (1.66)    (0.82) (0.20) (0.89) 
Science -0.05 0.23• 0.15   -0.02 0.22• 0.25 
 (-0.51) (1.95) (1.26)   (-0.82) (1.92) (1.45) 
Joint significance test of interest 
In politics and science(χ2 ) 
1.19 6.16* 5.67*    0.66 5.07• 4.52• 
DIGITAL DIVIDE 
Percentage of Gap explained by       
Human capital -0.46 -1.34 2.40 -0.79 2.11 -2.53 
Demographics 0.92 1.06 0.31 1.57 0.37 -2.90 
Job Sector 0.09 0.03 0.62 -0.11 -0.27 0.06 
Infrastructure -0.62 2.25 2.35 -1.10 1.29 -1.40 
Ti XX − : Mean difference in adoption ratesc 0.00 3.14 3.28 5.99 3.84  -7.30 
       
LOG EARNINGS EQUATIONb 
Computer use at work (OLS) 0.16** 0.07    0.25**    0.23**   0.33** 0.15 
 (3.14) (1.30) (3.31)   (3.60) (4.47) (1.53) 
Computer use at work(IV) -0.70* -0.03 -0.10   0.09 -0.32 -0.15 
 (-2.32) (-0.13) (-0.41)   (0.25) (-0.75) (-0.28) 
N 894 592 637 839 676 839 
Overidentification test of restriction on  
interest in politics and science (χ2 ) 
0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 
a Specification also included all the other variables included in Table 3 
b Specification also included all the other variables included in Table 4 
cDifference between mean adoption rate for individual countries and mean adoption rate for all countries combined 
 
Notes : z scores reported in parenthesis. ** significant at the 1st percentile.  * significant at the 5th percentile. 
 · significant at the 10th percentile 
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Table 6: Random effects regressions of log earnings in levels and differences using the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2000-2004  
 
 Estimation Summary information 
 Levels First difference Levels First difference 
   Mean Mean 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
Log of wages   7.79 0.30 
   (0.93) (0.68) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Computer use at work 0.17**  0.25  
 (0.03)  (0.43)  
Yes in 1, Yes in 2  -0.01  0.18 
  (0.03)  (0.37) 
Yes in 1, No in 2  -0.03  0.08 
  (0.04)  (0.27) 
No in 1, Yes in 2   0.02  0.05 
  (0.04)  (0.21) 
No in 1, No in 2   reference  0.69 
    (0.46) 
     
Age/10 -0.00 -0.21* 41.97 41.97 
 (0.17) (0.01) (10.36) (10.36) 
Grades of school completed  0.01  9.60 
  (0.01)  (1.05) 
Less than grade 7 reference  0.02  
   (0.13)  
Grade 8 0.23*  0.22  
 (0.11)  (0.42)  
Grade 9 0.24*  0.06  
 (0.12)  (0.23)  
Grade 10 0.26*  0.56  
 (0.11)  (0.50)  
Grade 11 and greater 0.17  0.15  
 (0.11)  (0.35)  
Female -0.43** 0.03 0.57 0.57 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.49) (0.49) 
     
R2 0.29 0.02   
N 6235 5000 6235 5000 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis for random effects estimates. Standard deviations reported in 
parenthesis for variable means.  ** significant at the 1st percentile.  * significant at the 5th percentile 
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 Endnotes 
 
1 See Katz and Autor (1999) for a comprehensive review of the changes in inequality and the 
explanations for those changes for OECD countries. More computer intensive sectors employ 
educated workers in greater proportions (Doms, Dunne and Troske(1997); Autor, Katz and 
Krueger, 1998) and have faster wage and productivity growth (Dunne et al, 2004). 
  
2 Krueger’s (1993) analysis of U.S. data; followed by Entorf et al (1999) for France; Liu, Tsou 
and Hammitt (2004) for Taiwan; Dolton and Makepiece (2004) for England ; Oosterbeek (2004) 
for the Netherlands; Krashinsky (2004) for the U.S.; and Dostie, Jayaraman and Trépanier (2006) 
for Canada; have found least squares estimates of returns to computer use on the job to be large 
and positive with an average of about 20%.  All but the first imposed corrections for possible 
endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity.  Estimated returns with controls are considerably 
smaller, ranging from 2-10% but are generally still positive and statistically significant. 
 
3 See Oliner and Sichel (200), Röller and Waverman (2001), Jorgenson (2001). 
 
4  Piatkowski(2004) presents evidence that links information technologies with accelerated 
growth in Central Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe, but the evidence includes only 
a very few countries and time periods.   
 
5 Based on 2001 World Bank data on per capita gross national income and monthly off-peak 
Internet service charges. 
  
6  See Chinn and Fairlie (2004) and Dasgupta, Lall and Wheeler for cross-country estimation of 
factors affecting IT use. 
 
7 With Internet access individuals can also discharge a part of their job-related work from home 
(for example, checking and responding to emails), which allows them to spend more time with 
family that many individuals may find desirable.    
 
8 The formal derivation of these results is available in an theoretical appendix  
 
9 If equation (3’) is approximated by a linear probability model, we can estimate (3’) and (4) 
simultaneously (Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati, 2003).  
 
10 We explored the use of ordered probit for individual countries and generated similar results.  
However, this proved impractical in the sample pooled across countries because the income 
ranges differed across countries.  There was no obvious way to accommodate overlapping pay 
ranges in the pooled sample using ordered probit.   
 
11 The quadratic form of the age variable was not statistically significant. 
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12 All the earnings functions were reestimated using degree dummies rather than years of 
schooling and using potential experience = age – education -6 rather than age.  Conclusions are 
not sensitive to these differences. 
 
13 In the studies cited in footnote 2, returns to computer use varied from 10-33% when computer 
usage is treated as exogenous. 
 
14 We tested the overidentification restriction that the taste for information measures can be 
excluded from the earnings equation.  We could only weakly accept the null hypothesis that the 
two measures do not enter the earnings function in the full sample.  In all other subsamples, the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected at even the 10th percentile. 
 
15 Very similar conclusion are obtained when we treat computer adoption as linear and estimate 
equations (3’) and (4) simultaneously.  However, the estimates are less stable and the standard 
errors are much larger. 
 
16 The relevant studies are cited in footnote 2.  
  
17 Note that if workers have strong enough tastes for working with computers, the wage 
differential between jobs with and without computers could even reverse with workers accepting 
lower wages for the perquisite of using a computer on the job. 
Theory Appendix to "Computer Adoption
and Returns in Transition"
1 The model
The model consists of N small open economies indexed by j 2 f1; 2::; Ng. In each economy, there is an
overlapping generations of individuals who live for two periods; in each period a continuum of individuals
is born. In addition, there is a continuum of two types of rms. Both types of rms produce a single
homogenous good. While type I rms use labor only, type II rms combine each worker with a computer to
produce output. The primitives and the problems of each entity is described below.
The small open economy assumption implies that agents can borrow and lend freely at a gross interest
rate R determined in the world markets.1
To ease notation, we avoid time subscripts below since the choice problem of all generations is identical.
1.1 Individuals
An individual indexed by i is identied by a pair fi;  ig, where i denotes her innate ability to learn, and
 i is a stand-in for her desire to be up-to-date with information/computer technology and/or her preference
for technological services such as the information that is accessible through the Internet (which is distinct
from consumption of homogenous goods). We assume that i and  i are jointly distributed over support
; 

and [1;  ] with CDF (PDF) given by G (; ) (g (; )). An individual knows her  and  . Her lifetime
utility is given by
U = ln ciy +  ln cio + Ci (1 + ) ln  i (1)
where ciy and cio denote the consumption of homogenous goods in her young and old age, respectively. The
variable Ci is a computer adoption variable takes a value of either 1 or 0; it is 1 if the individual adopts
computer, 0 otherwise. Thus, the individual can enjoy computers and its services only if her adoption choice
is unity. On the other hand, ciy and cio are continuous variables.
1The structure of nancial markets in a closed economy can be easily endogenized by having agents live for three periods,
and by modifying their human capital prole to ensure that agents borrow (save) in their rst (second) period of life. This will
unnecessarily complicate the analysis without yielding any further insights.
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An individual is endowed with a unit of time in both periods. In the rst period she has rawhuman
capital that equals her unit time endowment, and she can only work in the type I rm at a wage rate w.
In the rst period, however, she can educate herself by investing Hi in education that increases her human
capital (e¤ective labor) to h (i;Hi) > 1. It is assumed that an individuals human capital is perfectly
observable to the rms.
With enhanced human capital, the wage she can earn in a type I rm equals w h (i;Hi). Alternatively,
she can train herself in computer/information technology that enables her to not only enjoy its services, but
also qualies her to work in a type II rm that o¤ers a wage proportional to h (i;Hi) (more of this below).
However, learning computer/information technology costs k (i;Hi).
Assumptions It is assumed that
h1 > 0; h22 < 0;h2 > 0; h12  0: (2)
The rst set implies that human capital is increasing in education but with diminishing returns. Next, the
higher the innate ability, the higher is the human capital for a given amount of education. Finally, the
returns to education are non-decreasing in an agents innate ability.
We also assume
k1 < 0; k22 > 0; k2 < 0; k12 = 0: (3)
The rst set implies that the cost of adopting computer/information technology is decreasing and convex in
the amount of education. Next, it is decreasing in the individuals innate ability. The last assumption on the
separability of the cost function in i and Hi is not necessary and is merely done for the sake of analytical
simplicity.
It bears emphasis that the cost function k can be potentially location-specic. In particular, a location
with poorer infrastructure is likely to have a higher cost. For simplicity, however, we relegate the location-
specic cost di¤erences to the rmsproblem below.
1.2 Firms
All rms are perfectly competitive. A type I rm uses a unit of human capital to produce a unit of output.
Perfect competition then implies that w = 1.
Type II rms combine each worker with a computer/IT terminal to produce output. These terminals
enhance labor productivity: each unit of human capital produces  > 1 unit of output. However, set-
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ting up each terminal costs fj per period, where the subscript j captures the notion that the costs are
location-specic: a location with a poorer infrastructure entails a higher cost. Under perfect competition,
an individual with human capital h (i;Hi) is o¤ered a wage that equals  h (i;Hi)  fj .
1.3 The households problem
Given the wage structure, we now solve the problem for an individual located in location 1. To ease notation,
we drop subscript j below; the solution can be easily applied to any location.
The problem of an agent i is
max
Hi;ciy;cio;Ci2f0;1g
fln ciy +  ln cio + Ci (1 + ) ln  ig (4)
subject to
ciy +Hi + Ci k (i;Hi) = 1 + xi (5a)
cio +R xi = Ci ( h (i;Hi)  fj) + (1  Ci)h (i;Hi) (5b)
where xi denotes an individuals borrowing when young. The LHS (RHS) in both (5a) and (5b) represent
expenditures (resources available) to an agent in periods 1 and 2 respectively. As is standard, to avoid trends
in variables, below we assume that R =  1.
As Ci is a discrete choice, we rst solve the households choice problem separately for both Ci = 0 and
Ci = 1. Then, we compare the resulting indirect utilities to identify households who choose to adopt or not
to adopt computer/IT technology.
1.3.1 Ci = 0
Here, by substituting (5a) and (5b) in (4), the households problem can be reduced to
max
Hi;xi

ln (1 + xi  Hi) +  ln
 
h (i;Hi)   1 xi
	
(6)
The rst order conditions are
1
1 + xi  Hi =

h (i;Hi)   1 xi
h2 (i;Hi) ; (7a)
1
1 + xi  Hi =
1
h (i;Hi)   1 xi
: (7b)
Substituting (7b) in (7a) yields
h2 (i;H

i ) = 
 1 (8)
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where Hi is the optimal level of education when i does not train herself in computers. Finally solving for
xi from (7b) and substituting it in (6) yields the indirect utility:
W  (i) = (1 + ) [ln (1 Hi +  h (i;Hi ))  ln (1 + )] : (9)
1.3.2 Ci = 1
Here, by substituting (5a) and (5b) in (4), the households problem can be reduced to
max
Hi;xi

ln (1 + xi  Hi   k (i;Hi)) +  ln
 
 h (i;Hi)  f    1 xi
	
(10)
The rst order conditions are
1 + k2 (i;Hi)
1 + xi  Hi   k (i;Hi)
=

 h (i;Hi)  f  R xi
 h2 (i;Hi) (11a)
1
1 + xi  Hi   k (i;Hi)
=
1
 h (i;Hi)  f  R xi
(11b)
Substituting (11b) in (11a) yields
 h2 (i;H

i )
1 + k2 (i;H

i )
=  1 (12)
where Hi is the optimal level of education when i does train herself in computers. Finally solving for x

i
from (7b) and substituting it in (6) yields the indirect utility:
W  (i) = (1 + )
264 ln (1 Hi   k (i;Hi ) +  ( h (i;Hi )  f))
  ln (1 + ) + ln  i
375 (13)
The following Lemma characterizes the choice of education as a function of innate ability. It also establishes
that for an individual the amount of education is higher if she also chooses to train in computers.
Lemma 1 Both Hi and H

i are weakly increasing in i. Furthermore, H
 > H:
Proof. See Section 2.1.
Intuitively, a higher innate ability increases the marginal product of education, and therefore the indi-
vidual chooses a higher amount.2 The second result H > H is due to the feature that education not only
increases ones human capital, but also reduces the cost of learning computers, as assumed in (3), in case
the individual decides to train in computer/IT.
2Notice in particular that if h12 > 0, then both Hi and H

i are strictly increasing in i.
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1.3.3 The choice of computer adoption
Comparing indirect utilities given by (9) and (13) implies that Ci = 1 if and only if0B@1  Hi   k (i;Hi )| {z }
cost of education and computer adoption
+  h (i;H

i )  f| {z }
earning in type II rm
1CA  i
 1  Hi|{z}
cost of education
+ h (i;H

i )| {z }
earning in type I rm
(14)
where Hi and H

i solve (8) and (12) respectively. Equation (14) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given  and f , the computer adoption rule for an individual i is
Ci =
8><>: 1; if i  ^ ( i; ; f)0; if i < ^ ( i; ; f)
Moreover, ^1 < 0; ^2 < 0; ^3 > 0.
Proof. See Section 2.2.
The intuition behind the results stated in Proposition 1 is simple. Given the individuals preference for
technology and the market wages on a job with computers, the higher her innate ability the more likely she
is to adopt computers. The innate ability has a direct as well as indirect e¤ect on computer learning. A
higher ability facilitates a lower computer/IT learning cost. Second, a higher ability makes her achieve a
higher level of education that also reduces her cost of technology adoption: an indirect e¤ect.
The higher the individuals (hedonic) preference for technology, the lower is the ability at which she
decides to adopt computers. A higher productivity in type II rms (i.e., jobs with computers) leads to
higher equilibrium wages, thus inducing agents of lower abilities to also adopt computers and opt for working
in type II rms. Similarly, a higher cost of IT investment by rms lowers equilibrium wages. Then, only
relatively higher ability individuals will adopt and work on computer jobs. This is more likely to be observed
in countries with relatively poorer infrastructure.
An interesting question is: can an individual with i = ^ be indi¤erent between the two choices even
if her earnings in type II rms fall below that in type I rm? To answer this, rst note from (14) that if
she chooses to work in type II rms her education H will be higher than had she chosen to work in a
type I rm. In addition, she has to bear a cost of adopting computer/IT. However, if her preference for
computer/IT services were strong enough, i.e.,  i is large enough such that it compensates for her pecuniary
loss, she would still choose to work in the type II rm. A similar argument holds for individuals with i > ^.
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Thus, the model allows for instances where an individual chooses to work in type II rms even when wages
are lower, or more specically, even when wages net of cost of education and computer adoption are lower
relative to the other alternative of working in type I rms.
2 Proofs
2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Applying Implicit function theorem to (8) and (12) directly yields
dHi
di
=  h21 (i;H

i )
h22 (i;H

i )
 0
dHi
di
=     h21 (i;H

i )
  h22 (i;H

i )  k22 (i;Hi )
 0
For the second part, assume H  H. Then, since  > 1 and h22 < 0,  h2 (i;Hi ) > h2 (i;Hi ). Since
the denominator in (12) is less than unity,  h2(i;H

i )
1+k2(i;Hi )
> h2 (i;H

i ) = 
 1, which contradicts (12). Hence,
H > H.
2.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Fix  i; ; and f . By Envelope Theorem the derivative of the LHS in (14) k1 (i;Hi )+ h1 (i;Hi ) >
0 and that of the RHS is h1 (i;H

i ) > 0. Thus, both sides of (14) are increasing in i.
To prove the rst part we need to show that  k1 (i;Hi ) +  h1 (i;Hi ) > h1 (i;Hi ). This is done
by noting that  k1 (i;Hi ) > 0; h12 > 0, and Hi > Hi from Lemma 1.
The second set of results is obvious from (14).
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